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1. INTRODUCTION TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN IRELAND 
 
 
1.1. Overview of Collective Bargaining in Ireland 
 
The predominant level of collective bargaining in Ireland since 2009 is company-level with 
a highly decentralised, local firm-level structure. There is little or no formal coordination in 
collective bargaining in Ireland since the economic crisis. As we discuss though, a pattern 
has emerged in which a loose informal coordination has followed from strategic targeting 
and pattern-setting in sectors where unions have greater relative strength. Where trade 
unions are strong, and strategically organised, there is coordination. Where they are not, 
there is none. 
Trade union density in Ireland has been falling over recent decades and in the 
private sector it is typically estimated at 20% (OECD, 2017, Walsh 2015, 2016). Labour 
relations have improved significantly since the turbulent days of the 1980s but the end of 
national-level social partnership and move to a decentralised structure, the instability of the 
economic crash, and the moves to restore pay and benefits following economic recovery 
have resulted in a few high-profile strikes in retail and transport in recent times. Despite 
this, there is little appetite for or likelihood of a return to centralised bargaining in the 
medium-term future (Maccarrone et al 2019).  Rather the preference is for a move toward 
more social dialogue, rather than more formal bargaining.  
 
1.2. Recent Trends: From National-Level Bargaining to Firm-Level 
‘Pattern Bargaining’ 
 
The critical shift in collective bargaining in Ireland in recent years has been the dissolution 
of the national-level bargaining structures that had prevailed during the period of 
widespread, unprecedented economic growth during the Celtic Tiger. The collapse of 
National Social Partnership and its centralized wage bargaining system in Ireland following 
the crisis of the late 2000s has led to the emergence of a system of firm level bargaining 
across the private sector. Whilst public sector wage bargaining remains highly centralised, 
all pay negotiations in the private sector take place at the firm level. 
 This shift to firm-level negotiations and the associated decline in the collective 
bargaining role and influence of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and IBEC (Irish 
Business and Employers Confederation) has significant implications for the networks 
underlying wage negotiations and industrial relations in the Irish context. The move to local 
firm-level bargaining post-crisis has meant that in the Irish context, the degree and scope 
of coordination in wage bargaining is dependent on the relative strength of trade unions in 
the particular sector and current pay norms in company-level negotiations. This closely 
corresponds with the expectations of power resource theory in liberal market economies 
(Baccaro and Howell 2017; Doellgast et al 2018; Culpepper and Regan 2014). 
From 1987 to 2009, collective bargaining in Ireland was structured around a series 
of national agreements (National Social Partnership Agreements), initially between the 
trade unions under the umbrella of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU), the employers’ 





include a variety of civil society bodies and voluntary organisations and its remit extended 
beyond negotiations over pay to include social dialogue and agreements around fiscal, 
social, economic and industrial policy (Regan 2012, 2017, Roche 2007).  
However, the tripartite national level structures came under significant strain 
following the onset of the economic crisis in the late 2000s. In the public sector, union and 
organisational capacity was such that following an initial round of pay cuts, agreements 
were struck between unions and government on pay reductions and changes in productivity 
and working practices. In the private sector, national level bargaining could not be sustained 
and through 2010, negotiations between IBEC and ICTU provided a protocol for the process 
of a rapid decentralisation of collective bargaining. Since the end of Social Partnership then, 
pay in the private sector has been set primarily at firm-level, either through negotiations in 
unionised companies or through unilateralism where unions are not present (Hickland and 
Dundon 2016).  
Initially, negotiations focused on concession bargaining as unions sought to 
negotiate to moderate proposed pay reductions and to avoid substantial job losses. As the 
economy began to recover in the period between 2011 and 2013, a system sometimes 
called ‘pattern bargaining’ (Roche and Gormley, 2017) began to emerge across the firm-
level negotiations in which SIPTU and specifically its manufacturing division, developed a 
strategy of seeking a broadly similar pay increase target in each set of negotiations so as 
to establish a pay norm. This strategy involved the identification of a viable pay rise goal of 
two per cent based on a consideration of the European Central Bank’s inflation target and 
cross-national trends in comparable industries, and the strategic targeting of highly 
profitable market-leading firms in the multinational-dominated, pharmaceutical and 
medical devices sectors that had been relatively unaffected by the crash.  
A senior SIPTU official deeply involved in the development of this strategy identified 
the pay norms in the German chemicals industry and broader German economy as key to 
the goal-setting. This corresponds with the findings of other major work on the genesis of 
the two per cent pay norm (Roche & Gormley, 2017a). The initial agreements averaged out 
at two per cent with a focus on pay deals of a somewhat longer duration often of two to 
three years but as long as five years in certain cases. The strategy here focused on pay and 
employment stability with deals often referred to as ‘pay and stability’ agreements. This 
emphasis on stability was a key component of both internal SIPTU strategy but it was also 
attractive to unionised multinational employers in a decentralised context as it provided for 
extended periods of relatively secure industrial peace and consistent targets for delivery.  
As the economy recovered after the crisis, the strategy moved to the extension of 
the pay agreements and two per cent norm beyond the initially targeted firms in 
pharmaceuticals and medical devices to a variety of export-oriented sectors. As the number 
of deals increased, the two per cent goal became a norm for negotiated agreements 
between unions and employers beyond those led by SIPTU negotiators. It ultimately came 
to constitute the standard for pay rises in non-unionised companies (Roche and Gormley 
2017b). The two per cent norm was reinforced and rubberstamped by its use as a key point 
of reference by the conciliatory Workplace Relations Commission (WRC), and in particular 
it formed the basis for Labour Court conflict resolution recommendations. In many ways, 
the success of the strategy and the extent of the uptake of the norm is underlined by the 
fact that less than one-fifth of pay deals were referred to the WRC or Labour Court in the 
years following the establishment of the norm.  In more recent years as economic growth 
has been consistently robust, agreements across firms have moved closer to an average of 







2. STATE OF THE ART 
 
In the Irish industrial relations literature, there is little scholarship to this point examining in 
substantive detail the role of informal networks in wage negotiations and collective 
bargaining. The research on the changes in the collective bargaining structure in Ireland 
since the economic crisis tend to illustrate the initial shifts from national to firm-level 
bargaining that predominantly took the form of concession bargaining through to 
approximately 2011 (Roche & Teague, 2015; Roche, Teague & Coughlan, 2015). As 
economic recovery began to take root, the literature, drawing on quantitative and 
qualitative evidence, identifies the emergence of a form of bargaining broadly 
conceptualised as a form of ‘pattern bargaining’ based on the strategic targeting of highly 
profitable multinational firms in the Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices sector. This is 
led by SIPTU’s Manufacturing division in order to establish a trend for pay rises that could 
then be extended across export-oriented sectors, and latterly the broader economy (Roche 
and Gormley, 2017a; Roche and Gormley 2017b).  
The literature indicates that the two per cent pay target that emerged as the average 
outcome across the agreements from 2011 onwards was essentially the product of first, a 
combination of union strength in the relevant sectors to establish the trend and second, a 
small cohesive network of key actors within SIPTU. In turn, the two per cent target was 
considered to be affordable by firms including those beyond the highly profitable export-
oriented sectors (Roche and Gormley, 2017a, p.250). The interview evidence from this 
project with senior union officials, HR managers within major firms subject to strategic 
targeting, and senior collective bargaining consultants familiar with employer wage 
negotiations strategy tend to confirm the importance of this tight network of individuals 
within the strongest union in establishing this strategy, and ultimately the pay trend. But it 
also highlights the critical importance of informal links and personal relationships between 
union officials, HR managers in major ‘pattern-setting’ firms, and employer representative 
bodies and/or consultancies in the development and implementation of this strategy 
broadly characterised as ‘pattern bargaining.’ 
From this project’s extensive interviews with union officials, employers, consultants, 
members of representative bodies, and industrial relations journalists a clear consensus 
view emerges that informal networks and personal relationships between key actors within 
the trade union movement and between unions and employers are key to understanding 
wage bargaining in the Irish context. These relationships and informal networks are the 
product of engagement through Ireland’s major industrial relations conflict resolution 
institutions including the Workplace Relations Commission (previously the Labour 
Relations Commission) and the Labour Court as well as through the traditional umbrella 
organisations of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) and IBEC, the employer’s 
association.  
This is augmented by conferences such as those run by the unions, the Industrial 
Relations News national conference, and human resource representative bodies such as 
Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD). These patterns of informal 
engagement developed in some cases during the period of social partnership but have 
persisted and arguably grown in their substantive importance since the move to company-





Despite the very consistent identification of the critical role of these patterns of 
informal relations by those interviewees deeply familiar with the realities of collective 
bargaining in Ireland, this has not been addressed in depth in the scholarly literature on 
industrial relations in Ireland. This project collates and triangulates between quantitative 
survey evidence and particularly extensive, wide-ranging qualitative interview materials 
from a variety of key actors to provide detailed empirical demonstration and corroboration 
of this widely-held view among industrial relations practitioners in Ireland.  
In this way, it provides one of the first direct studies of the importance of informal 
networks in the Irish context, and in particular, it highlights the importance of intra-union 
networks, led by a very small number of individuals. The core theoretical takeaway is that 
we consider the type of “pattern bargaining” that other scholars have identified in Ireland 
as a function of the power resources of trade unions. Where unions are strong in Ireland, 
collective bargaining coordination occurs. Where they are weak, it does not. The importance 
of interpersonal relations and social networks are an important empirical observation of 
what underpins this coordination. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGY  
 
Traditionally, significant strands of the industrial relations literature has focused upon the 
development of quantitative institutional indicators to examine the mechanisms sustaining 
collective bargaining coordination as well as the extent and form of wage coordination (e.g. 
Kenworthy, 2001; Visser, 2019). Over time, these indicators have extended to include 
classification of company-level bargaining of the form that predominates in the Irish 
context, so as to illustrate the development of bargaining beyond multi-employer 
bargaining. However, despite the quality of these aggregate indicators, they tend to suffer 
from a tendency to focus on coordination at the structural level and the vertical aspect of 
coordination. In particular, these structural indicators fail to capture the behavioural, 
relational, and ultimately, informal nature of collective bargaining and wage coordination.  
In particular, the predominant company-level composition of wage bargaining in 
Ireland since 2009, and the strategy to achieve wage coordination developed by SIPTU and 
often characterised as ‘pattern bargaining’ that has since developed, is fundamentally built 
upon informal networks and personal relationships. Specifically, union power resources, 
intra-union cohesive networks, and informal relations between union officials, firm HR 
managers, and industrial relations consultants and reporters tend to drive wage 
coordination strategy in the sectors in which coordination is present in Ireland. These 
networks, relations and behavioural dynamics that underpin variation in collective 
bargaining coordination across major sectors in the Irish economy cannot be captured using 
the aggregated institutionalist indicators commonly employed in the cross-national 
industrial relations literature. To address some of these limitations, this project deploys 
quantitative survey data and social network analysis indicators alongside the use of 
qualitative semi-structured interviews and triangulation with secondary materials to 
investigate the presence, structure, and impact of networks, informality, and relations 
within Irish industrial relations and collective bargaining. 
The first component of our empirical strategy are the surveys distributed to key 
actors in the two major sectors of interest, namely the pharmaceuticals sector and the large 





Following initial exploratory research on the potential members of networks in the 
two sectors and given the decentralised nature of wage bargaining in Ireland, we identified 
a number of key actors within the major unions in each sector, particularly SIPTU officials 
in the Pharmaceuticals Sector and Mandate officials in the Retail Sector, as well as Human 
Resource Managers within the largest companies in each of the two sectors. In addition, we 
also identified those with potential linkages to each of the two sectors within the employer 
representative bodies.  
From this, we constructed four versions of the online survey adapted to the Irish 
context. These four surveys focused on unions in each sector and in the case of employers 
was adapted to address specific firm-level negotiation and network experiences given the 
structure of the system. These surveys were disseminated through email links via the 
SurveyMonkey online survey platform with individualised messages, details on 
confidentiality and consent, and an explanation of the nature and purpose of the cross-
national project. There were consistent reminders and follow-ups with the individuals 
identified as potential members of the networks from the exploratory analysis but there has 
been significant variation in the responsiveness of identified actors across the two sectors 
and between unions and employers. 
The second component of the analysis is a series of semi-structured interviews with 
union officials, employer organisation representatives, firm HR managers, consultants 
specialising in industrial relations advice for employers, and key additional actors in 
particular from Industrial Relations News (IRN), a subscription media service providing 
extensive coverage of industrial relations developments and pay agreements in the Irish 
context. These interviews covered a number of key themes focusing on assessments of 
changes in the collective bargaining structure over time, organisational goals in the previous 
pay rounds, internal strategy development, the most influential actors and events for wage 
coordination in the relevant sector, and assessments of the character and shape of the 
network of wage bargaining in the sector(s) overall.  While these themes were consistent 
across all interviews, relevant additional discussions emerged throughout. Interviews 
typically lasted for approximately one hour. 
The implementation of the survey in the Irish context has been challenging 
particularly due to the individualised firm-level structure of collective bargaining in Ireland 
as well as other key (and related factors) such as the unwillingness of employers to 
cooperate, the conflictual nature of union-employer relations in the Retail sector in 
particular and the lack of organisational capacity of unions in some cases. This resulted in 
low response rates and a significant lack of cooperation from employers in both sectors and 
from unions and employers in the Retail sector. 
The variation in the effective implementation of the online survey demonstrates key 
features of the Irish industrial relations context. The highest response rate and most 
significant degree of cooperation comes from unions, specifically SIPTU, in the 
Pharmaceuticals sector which corresponds very clearly with expectations. SIPTU is the 
strongest union in either of the two sectors under consideration in the Irish context with the 
most significant organisational capacity and the most extensive unionisation, while the 
Pharmaceutical sector organisation operating within the broader Manufacturing division is 
a particular cohesive and effectively organised actor. This is critical to its capability to 
develop and implement bargaining strategy and to provide a degree of pay coordination 
throughout the Pharmaceutical sector. This substantive capacity and SIPTU’s power 





the coordinated pattern bargaining that has emerged is primarily a product of the union’s 
strength and strategy specifically.  
This capacity and effectiveness not only facilitates coordinated wage negotiations 
but is also critical to explaining the incentives, willingness, and ability to cooperate with the 
online survey. To the extent that a network of actors produces wage bargaining in Ireland’s 
Pharmaceutical sector, this network is essentially made up of union and specifically SIPTU 
actors. These relevant SIPTU actors were the most systematic in their engagement with the 
survey and their communication. The cooperation of SIPTU with the study is in fact, we 
contend, a theoretically relevant observation in that  it demonstrates, in line with theoretical 
frameworks emphasising the resources of unions as a key explanatory factor in accounting 
for effective wage coordination, that the development and implementation of pay 
bargaining strategy and the incentive and capacity to communicate this require resources, 
cohesion, and centralisation. Across both unions and employers in our two sectors of 
interest, SIPTU and its Pharmaceutical sector organisation stand out in this regard. 
In the Retail sector, the lack of organisational capacity and resources among the 
key unions especially Mandate has resulted in an absence of coordinated strategy in pay 
bargaining and engagement with employers. These limited resources and the lack of 
effective organisation have resulted in little in the way of substantive networked relations 
and similarly help explain the limited responsiveness to the online survey and engagement 
with the project more broadly. The unions have generally poor and somewhat conflictual 
relations with employers and rely to a significant extent on social movement and 
campaigning tactics rather than the type of cohesive, centrally-devised wage strategy and 
implementation as in the case of SIPTU in Pharmaceuticals above. It is therefore difficult to 
mobilise responsiveness and to identify the operation of any coherent network and 
coordination between actors.  
There have been very significant challenges in generating engagement with and 
response to the online survey among employers in both sectors. This is the product of a 
number of factors. Our interview findings corroborate other scholarship on Irish industrial 
relations that contends that IBEC, the employers’ association, having been a major player 
during Social Partnership is now largely disengaged and rarely involved in negotiations and 
collective bargaining issues.  
This has removed a major point of entry with respect to research engagement with 
Irish employers but also corresponds with a major fragmentation and breakdown in inter-
employer coordination since the move to company-level bargaining. The lack of 
coordination traditionally in Ireland with an institutional framework that is liberal, market-
led in orientation combined with the collapse of the national-level structures in place until 
2009 has resulted in a deeply atomised structure and little in the way of networked 
relations. Closely related, the move to the negotiation of agreements at firm-level has 
resulted in a very significant reluctance to participate due to questions of commercial 
sensitivity and the effective absence of any clear network of actors as negotiations centre 
on bilateral union-employer negotiations at the individual firm or indeed plant-level where 
workers are unionised and unilateral employer decisions in non-unionised firms. There is 
little or no organisation between employers in either sector. This has implications for 
gatekeeping in terms of survey participation. In the Pharmaceutical sector, the primary 
access challenge relates to commercial privacy. The issues are compounded in the Grocery 
Retail sector as there is limited unionisation and indeed non-recognition of unions in certain 






The difficulties in the implementation of the online survey in the Irish case require 
consideration of the broader applicability of the appropriateness and adequacy of applying 
an online survey specifically and network analysis more broadly to institutional contexts in 
which firm-level bargaining predominates. Pay coordination in the Irish context is 
dependent on the power resources and associated capacity to develop and deploy pay 
strategies by trade unions as in this context, there is very little organisation and coordination 
among employers.  
As such, the networks that facilitate pay bargaining are in the Irish case intra-union 
networks. In our two sectors of interest, the SIPTU Manufacturing division and its 
Pharmaceutical committee provide this strategy and resultant coordination in pay 
bargaining outcomes. Therefore, our analysis of the key actors in the network is focused on 
a small set of union officials. Engaging employers in the Pharmaceutical sector has been 
extremely challenging as there is little in the way of a meaningful network here. In the Retail 
sector, there is far less institutional capacity within the trade unions to organise and 
mobilise to produce effective pay bargaining strategy and coordinated outcomes as the 
unions are fragmented and in key cases have far fewer power resources.  Employers in 
Retail in many cases have conflictual relations with the unions and are often based 
primarily in the United Kingdom, limiting the scope for organisation and inter-employer 
communication further. Absent union coordination, there is little if any coordination to 
speak of. Fundamentally, there is a deeply fragmented and atomised structure to 
negotiations in the sector and therefore the viability and appropriateness of the 
methodology are limited.  
Finally, the Irish context illustrates the challenges in applying a network analysis to 
examine coordination due to specific contextual patterns of ‘coordinating messaging’ that 
the method struggles to capture. In the Irish firm-level bargaining structure, we identify a 
pattern of the use of ‘information as coordination’ in which Industrial Relations News (IRN), 
a media outlet, publishes accounts of ongoing negotiations and pay agreements struck 
across sectors. These  publications are used by employers and unions to learn about 
patterns in their sector and the established pay norms with evidence that the stronger 
unions i.e. SIPTU in Pharmaceuticals  with the capacity to strategize and communicate pay 
goals can seek to send signals through IRN publications of agreement details that are then 
internalised by HR managers in firms in the sector ahead of potential subsequent 
negotiations. In turn, these patterns as reported by IRN are also drawn upon by the conflict 
resolution bodies in the conciliation and recommendations concerning pay disputes. 
Despite the importance of this ‘information as coordination’ dynamic in the firm-level 
bargaining system in Ireland, IRN and its role is difficult for the methodology to effective 
capture. Broadly then, critical consideration must be given to the capacity of network 
analysis to capture the realities of collective bargaining in Ireland due to the structure of 
bargaining, the lack of employer organisation, the challenges of access, and the difficulties 
















4.1.1.  Socio-economic situation of the sector 
 
The pharmaceutical sector is of very substantial importance to the Irish economy. The 
sector is the main driver of goods exports across the entire economy with the broader 
pharmaceuticals and medical device sector making up over sixty per cent of total goods 
exports. The country is now the seventh largest exporter of pharmaceutical and medical 
device products in the world. The sector in Ireland is dominated by the large multinational 
firms with all ten of the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies operating in Ireland and 
fourteen of the top fifteen multinationals having established a presence in the jurisdiction. 
These market-leading firms include Pfizer, Novartis, MSD, Baxter, Allergan, GSK, Teva, 
Perrigo, Alexion and Roche. There are seventy-five firms in total in Ireland with ninety plants 
in full manufacturing operation around the country with twenty-two further sites under 
construction as of 2019.  
As a key export-oriented sector built on highly-skilled manufacturing labour, the 
sector and the export growth it generates was critical in Ireland’s recovery from the 
economic crisis, as the sector remained globally stable and highly profitable given the low 
elasticity of demand for its products. This export growth and profitability was associated 
first with stability and resilience in employment in the manufacturing sector, which was key 
to providing some support from domestic consumption during the crisis. And second, the 
sector’s ability to sustain wage growth in the early stages of economic recovery provided 
scope for the strategic targeting for the establishment of a national pattern of pay increases 
discussed below. 
While employment in the pharmaceuticals and medical devices sector is 
substantial, it does not match its contribution to Ireland’s exports. According to data from 
the Central Bank, from 2018, approximately 44,000 people were employed in basic 
pharmaceutical manufacturing and the preparation of pharmaceutical products (Central 
Bank of Ireland, 2019). The BioPharmaChem division of the Irish employer’s association 
puts the figure for those directly employed in the sector at approximately 26,000 with a 
sizeable contingent employed indirectly providing services to the sector (BioPharmaChem 
Ireland, 2019). This corresponds to approximately two per cent of total employment as 
compared to pharmaceuticals exports share which consistently makes up over half of total 
goods exports and has peaked at over sixty per cent in recent years.  
Importantly, employment in the pharmaceuticals sector is strongly regionally 
concentrated around specific clusters with long-standing hotspots in Cork and Dublin but 
also growing clusters in the South-Eastern region around Waterford and in the West of 
Ireland, concentrated on Galway, Mayo, and Sligo. This stands in contrast to employment in 
other major multinational export-oriented services employers that tend to be strongly 
concentrated in Dublin and the surrounding region. 
The Pharmaceutical sector blends particularly high-end research and development 
and relatively highly-skilled manufacturing along with some more basic factory floor 
manufacturing positions in the larger established plants. Workers in the sector tend to be 
highly educated with over sixty-five per cent of those employed holding third level 





(BioPharmaChem Ireland, 2019). A quarter of all PhD holders in Ireland working in industry 
are also employed in the sector. In line with this, salaries in the sector  are typically above 
the national average with significantly higher salaries for engineers in the multinational 
firms and interviews with HR managers in prominent Pharmaceutical companies in Ireland 
indicate that the demand for labour and the extent of competition regionally in Ireland has 
produced strong increment-based incentives for employees to remain with a firm for a 
longer period. The sector has therefore typically been associated with secure, long-term and 
pensionable employment and given the strong growth in the sector, there have been 
significant productivity and associated pay increases in recent times with relatively limited 
industrial conflict  even during the economic crisis and the recovery period as pressures for 
pay rises grew. 
 
4.1.2. Collective Bargaining in the Pharmaceuticals Sector in Ireland 
 
The pharmaceutical sector in Ireland is heavily unionised marking it out as somewhat 
unusual for an FDI-led, export-oriented sector in Ireland dominated by foreign 
multinationals. The Services Industrial and Professional Trade Union (SIPTU) and its 
pharmaceutical and manufacturing division representatives have been key in the 
organisation of bargaining strategy and negotiations in the sector and have constituted the 
key force behind the coordination strategy that has emerged since the move to localised 
individual, firm-level (and indeed plant-level) bargaining since the end of Social Partnership. 
SIPTU is, by some distance, the major representative of workers in the Pharmaceutical and 
Medical Devices sector which generates approx. 60% of Ireland’s manufacturing exports. 
As outlined above, the Pharmaceutical Sector Committee led by Alan O’Leary alongside 
Manufacturing Division Chair Gerry McCormack developed and implemented a coordinated 
strategy to target individual high-profile, ‘market leading’ pharmaceutical firms with a 2% 
pay goal as part of an approach that ultimately sought to extend this norm across sectors 
over time as Ireland moved into economic recovery.  
Given the dominance of multinational firms within the sector, the broad economy-
wide shift to firm-level bargaining and the lack of incentives or structures for employer 
coordination, the SIPTU Pharmaceutical Sector Committee was the key source of 
coordination for the establishment of a 2% norm across the sector and the eventual 
extension of this pattern to other sectors. Agreements have been negotiated at firm-level 
since the end of national-level wage bargaining with a focus on longer agreements often 
framed as ‘pay and stability agreements’ typically of two years but sometimes as long as 
five years. 
Since the collapse of Social Partnership, IBEC as the employer’s association has had 
little or no role in negotiations in the sector with individual firms (predominantly the US 
multinationals) conducting negotiations directly with SIPTU. In identifying the network 
underpinning wage coordination in the sector, the primary focus is therefore on the union 
officials and industrial organizers that make up the sector committee. The survey responses 
and resultant data for the Pharmaceutical sector correspond with this pattern as the key 
actors who are responsible for the original coordination of the wage negotiation strategy for 
the sector are the members of this committee and these are the respondents in the survey 
data collected. The key events are similarly the meetings of the sector committee and 
perhaps more precisely meetings of an even smaller subset of actors within SIPTU. The 





the observation that SIPTU is the strongest union playing the most significant role in 
generating coordination across unions and employers in both sectors.  
The absence of coordination on the employers’ side has very clear implications for 
survey responsiveness for these firms. As employers do not rely upon or utilise IBEC as part 
of their industrial relations strategy, each firm operates as an atomised unit negotiating 
directly with the unions with no inter-employer coordination. Individual firms operating 
outside of any coordinating structures are very reluctant to provide responses that relate to 
a company-specific negotiation between the HR managers within these firms and the union 
given, first, concerns about commercial sensitivities and second, the lack of any framework 
(e.g. IBEC) that may provide access and expectations regarding research of this kind. The 
lack of survey responses for employers are therefore reflective of the structure and pattern 
of firm-level collective bargaining now in evidence in Ireland where coordination, data 
collection, and strategy linking actors together within a network takes place within trade 
unions where these unions have sufficient power resources. In this way, the low response 
rate is itself a theoretically relevant observation in that it illustrates the structure of 
coordination as it occurs in the sector. This pattern has been confirmed through a variety of 
in-depth qualitative interviews with union officials, representatives from and former 
members of IBEC, and individual HR managers. 
Coordination in the pharmaceutical sector is a product of union coordination, 
primarily located within the relevant SIPTU division. A core element of this strategy is a 
process we term as ‘information as coordination’ conducted through the publication of the 
outcomes of pay negotiations through Industrial Relations News (IRN). As individual firms 
lack coordinating structures in the localised firm-level system, the establishment of a 
pattern across the sector required SIPTU and the leading actors to transfer information 
regarding pay agreement outcomes that approximated the 2% norm. This was then 
internalised and considered by individual HR managers in these firms as new rounds of 
wage negotiations approached.  
The key vehicle for this information as communication process is IRN, an 
independent subscription weekly magazine publication providing coverage of industrial 
relations issues. Qualitative interview evidence from a range of union officials, expert 
observers and HR managers confirms the role of IRN as a resource for identifying patterns 
in the particular sector for HR managers but also SIPTU’s strategy of providing details of 
pay agreements and the 2% pay norm strategy to IRN so as to use it as a conduit for 
dissemination.  
‘Information as coordination’ is critical in the Irish context and the use of IRN as a 
means of disseminating information (for the union) and a means of identifying expectations 
and patterns in other firms (for employers) is of substantial explanatory utility in accounting 
for how coordination happens when traditional network relations and coordination events 
are absent as they are on the employers’ side in this sector in Ireland. This information has 
similarly used by the Workplace Relations Commission and Labour Court to identify the 
norm within the sector when making recommendations. The final stage in the 
implementation of the strategy as identified was for the WRC and Labour Court to endorse 
the 2% norm based on the analysis of wage agreements information published by IRN. The 
role of IRN is captured clearly in the qualitative interviews but the nature of ‘information as 








4.1.3. Network Analysis of CB in Pharmaceuticals: Survey results 
 
Table 1 below presents an overview of the identified potential respondents and actual 
response rates for the Pharmaceutical sector in Ireland. While the absolute number of 
participants may appear low in a comparative sense, this matches clearly the qualitative 
interview evidence regarding the key actors in coordination processes in the Irish Pharma 
sector and provides an effective overview of the reality of the network. 
 
Table 1: Pharmaceutical Sector Respondents Identified and Survey Response Rate in 
Ireland 
Sector Exploratory Network 
Size (actors in survey 







Pharma 10 9 90% 
 
 
We see that the response rate for this sector is very high and the vast majority of 
individuals identified from the exploratory interviews and secondary research, focusing on 
the structure of the network and the development of a purposive sample, did in fact 
participate in the survey. The respondent pool is heavily tilted towards the participation of 
those on the union side with seven of the nine respondents coming from within SIPTU, the 
union primarily representing workers in the Pharmaceutical sector, and with two additional 
respondents either from HR operations or familiar with employer practice in industrial 
relations in the Pharmaceutical sector. This matches closely the qualitative interview 
evidence indicating that SIPTU provide cohesion and organisation within the firm-level 
bargaining structure in the Pharmaceutical sector and the low employer participation rate 
illustrates the commercial sensitivity and fragmentation of employers within this structure. 
The primary role of the union officials in the sample is overwhelmingly technical and the 
sample is predominantly male (7 men, 2 women) in line with the patterns identified in both 
the preliminary and substantive qualitative interviews. 
The majority of individuals have been working in wage-setting in the sector for more 
than five years and each individual (with one exception) has been working for their current 
organisation for five years or more including in most cases some experience in working in 
wage-setting in other sectors. This is further evidence of the primacy of SIPTU respondents 
in our sample, the substantial experience of SIPTU’s negotiators, and that union’s 
particularly important role given its capacity to lead effective coordination in this sector and 
others.  
We now consider patterns of interaction in the Pharmaceutical sector in Ireland.  
Table 2 illustrates, first, the average number of key events attended by our sample 
respondents, and second, the percentage of events attended as compared with the 
maximum number of events attended for any actor in the network. Actors typically attend 
between 6 and 7 key events and this is largely uniform across our sample. In turn, Table 3 
demonstrates that formal meetings, both bilateral and multilateral, are the most common 
forms of meetings for Irish respondents. There are however major caveats here. First, while 
it is clear that the major actors responsible for organising coordination in Pharmaceuticals 





as events do not necessarily capture the informal mechanics of coordination in Ireland in 
particular the use of Industrial Relations News as a form of ‘information as coordination.’ 
This mechanism does not involve meetings (even of an informal nature) but instead 
produces coordination by alerting and informing employers and specifically HR managers 
in major firms of deals elsewhere in the sector and the wage norms and targets that now 
characterise agreements in the sector. Second, interview evidence similarly indicates there 
are already typically clear expectations of the likely parameters of negotiations and a 
potential agreement at the point at which formal meetings take place between unions and 
employers. Finally, many of the key meetings with respect to wage bargaining in this sector 
typically take place within SIPTU as the union provides, through its strategy and resources, 
much of the organisation and cohesion in wage negotiations across the sector in how it 
deals with individual firms. 
 
Table 2: Average Absolute Number and Percentage of Events attended 
Sector Absolute number of 
events attended 
Relative number of 
events attended 
Pharma 6.78 85% 
 
 
Table 3: Predominant form of interaction in Irish Pharmaceutical Sector 
Informal Bilateral  
Meetings 







2.5 4 1.88 3 
 
   
Table 4 identifies the importance of the economic and/or sector context as the 
major challenge to coordination in the Pharmaceutical sector underlining the role of 
broader institutional factors in conditioning the scope for effective coordination and, taken 
alongside interview evidence, illustrating the particular challenges posed by bargaining 
within liberal market structures. Respondents also identify challenges posed by a lack of 
trust and power differences between the unions and employers but these are not 
necessarily considered on average to be major impediments. Importantly despite the 
structure of firm-level bargaining, respondents do not tend to identify fragmentation as a 
major challenge. This is due to the strong degree of organisation, capacity, and cohesion 
within SIPTU as the major union in the sector that serves as by far the primary 
representative body for Pharmaceutical workers and through its internal structure and 
strategy provides a form of wage bargaining coordination itself even though employers are 
fragmented and do not display coordination among themselves. 
 
Table 4: Main Challenges to Coordination (1-5 scale, higher values indicate greater 
challenges) 

















The survey evidence indicates a significant role for pattern setters in the 
Pharmaceutical sector. The majority of respondents identify the presence of pattern setting 
firms in the sector and responses along with interview data indicate that these pattern 
setters are the major multinational firms. In line with the pay target strategy developed and 
implemented by SIPTU based on their evaluation of ability to pay and the capacity of high-
profile deals with market-leading firms to establish a pattern, respondents identify Pfizer, 
GSK, MSD, Bristol Myers, Leo Pharma and Teva as critical pattern setters. This set of firms 
matches closely those targeted early by SIPTU to establish pay and stability agreements 
around the two per cent target and through establishing expectations based on these deals 
and their publicization in Industrial Relations News, this became the pattern across the 
sector. 
 
Table 5: Respondents’ Views on Pattern Setters for Wage-Setting in Pharmaceuticals 
Sector Response Number of 
Responses 
Pharma No 3 
 Yes 6 
 Total 9 
 
 
Table 6: Top Pattern-Setting Firms in Pharmaceuticals 
Firm Number of Responses Identifying Firm 
Pfizer 6 
GSK 5 
Bristol Myers 4 








1-Mode Networks based on frequencies of contact (contact networks) 
 
Next, we consider the networks themselves. Table 7 outlines the broad descriptive 
of the contact network established from the survey responses while Table 8 identifies the 
major players and their influence within the network. Table 9 lays out the density, 
centralisation and strength of ties within the network. Finally, Figure 1 illustrates the 
network visually. 
The data and visualisation illustrates very clearly the patterns identified in extensive 
qualitative interviews conducted with those within the sector and those familiar with it. The 
key actors are within the major union SIPTU and these actors have the strongest links to 
one another. These actors operate at distinct levels within the union from the deputy 
General Secretary to the head of the Manufacturing division through to sectoral organiser 
for Pharmaceuticals specifically and from this to individual officials conducting wage 





former leading officials at Manufacturing Division and Pharmaceutical sectoral level and 
this makes up the core of the network. Industrial organisers operating at firm-level do not 
have the same extent of frequency of contacts and connections as exemplified by Actor A 
in Column B of Figure 1. Respondents identify three actors as the most influential and these 
three individuals are the current and former head of the Manufacturing division and the 
current Pharmaceutical sector lead organiser. These are the individuals responsible for the 
development and implementation of the two per cent pay norm strategy that SIPTU 
instituted across the sector and subsequently more broadly following the establishment of 
the pattern at market-leading firms in Pharmaceuticals. These actors have remained critical 
to the continuation of this bargaining strategy (with higher targets) led by SIPTU that has 
provided for effective coordination in a context where firm-level bargaining and 
fragmentation of employers and their representation have been the norm. 
 
Table 7: General descriptive statistics for the Pharmaceutical contact network 




Average number of 
ties with other 
actor  actros 
(unweighted.  any 
frequency) 
Average number of 
ties with other actors 
(unweighted, only 
links>5) 
Pharma 6 15 5 2.7 
 
 
Table 8: Key actors in the Pharmaceutical sector network 
Sector Actors with 
top degree 
(weighted) 
Actors with top 
betweenness 
(weighted) 






Pharma B, D, E all all B, D, E 
 
 
Table 9: Density, Centralisation, and Tie Strength in Irish Pharmaceuticals 










































Figure 1: Ireland Pharmaceutical Contact Network              
 
Column A:  
all frequencies of contact are included 
 
Column B: links ≤5 have been removed for 
better visual interpretation (scale from 





Figure 2 illustrates the contact network with non-respondents included (Column B) 
alongside the primary contact network as above (Column A). Considering this network, we 
identify two additional elements of interest. First, we see that there are additional linkages 
between sectoral and divisional organisers and industrial officials on the ground conducting 
negotiations and deals within the firms even though not all of these firm-level negotiators 
(e.g. NR1, NR2, NR5) responded to the survey.  This underlines that the network of 
coordination in Pharmaceuticals in Ireland is conducted through contact and 
communication between higher levels of the union organisational pyramid within SIPTU 
with firm-level negotiators implementing this strategy in each firm to first establish and 
then reinforce the norm. Second, we see certain contacts and links between SIPTU officials 
and employers’ representative groups such as BioPharmaChem Ireland or consultants 
representing employers in negotiations such as Stratis (NR6, NR7). In particular, there are 
clear links between the current and former heads of the SIPTU Manufacturing Division 
Chairs and these individuals and certain contacts between organisers operating at firm-
level and representatives from these groups. These linkages are though typically weaker 
and less dense than those between the core group organising and implementing strategy 
within SIPTU. This in turn corresponds with interview evidence indicating an occasional role 
only for these employer representatives and consultants given SIPTU’s main role in 
conducting negotiations and successfully implementing strategy with individual employers 
themselves. Furthermore, the non-responses themselves illustrate the limited engagement 
of employers and their representative bodies with the survey that provides some indication 
of their broader disengagement and the lack of avenues for access within the contemporary 










Figure 2: Ireland Pharmaceutical Contact Network with Non-Respondents                   
    
 
Column A: Contact Network  
 






Co-attendance networks (based on 2-Mode data) 
Finally, we consider 2-Mode data combining survey responses and contact networks for 
both actors and events. The findings in Table 10 and Figures 2 and 3 tend to confirm those 
above. The top event attendees and those engaged in the most extensive communication 
through meetings and events are the key influential actors from SIPTU leading 
Manufacturing Divisional and Pharmaceutical Sectoral organising from the 1-mode data 
above. We see the prominence and extensive ties to the Lead  Sectoral Organiser in 
particular in Figure 2 as the key actor responsible for mobilising and coordinating SIPTU’s 
pay bargaining strategy but we also clearly see the role for the former and current 
Manufacturing Division chairs that played a very significant role in devising the strategy 
originally and of course, in extending the pay norm when established more broadly across 
other sectors within Manufacturing. Again, this corresponds very closely with evidence from 
extensive qualitative interviews conducted with these individuals and others in the sector. 
 



































Figure 3: Ireland Pharmaceutical Co-attendance networks from affiliation data (complete 




Figure 4: Ireland Pharmaceutical Co-attendance networks from affiliation data (reduced 




4.2. Large Grocery Retail 
 
4.2.1. Socio-economic situation of the sector 
 
The grocery retail sector is one of Ireland’s largest private sector employers and a major 
contributor to the domestic economy. The retail sector as a whole employs two hundred and 
eighty five thousand workers with forty-two thousand businesses operating across the 
country making up approximately fourteen per cent of employment and is a particularly 
important source of employment outside of the greater Dublin area (Retail Ireland, 2019). 
Data for the supermarket sector specifically suggests it is worth nine billion euro and best 
estimates indicate that the five largest supermarket retailers employ approximately 





firms, Dunnes Stores and Musgraves with the latter operating its larger outlets under the 
SuperValu brand, and three international companies in Tesco (UK), Lidl and Aldi (both 
Germany).  Dunnes, SuperValu, and Tesco are the three largest firms with each holding 
approximately one-fifth of the customer base and Lidl and Aldi constituting around twelve 
per cent each.  
Workers in the sector are typically employed on limited contracts and hourly rates 
through agreements at firm-level based on engagement between employers and unions. In 
other cases, however including the two large German discount retailers, there is very limited 
membership and substantial issues with respect to union recognition. Despite this, these 
two firms have both committed independently to paying the living wage in recent years 
potentially as part of a strategy of pre-emptive action to counter unionisation and 
mobilisation drives within their companies. In Dunnes Stores, there have also been 
significant clashes between Mandate, the primary union representing workers in the sector, 
and the employer regarding engagement with the union. Given the lower skill profile and 
the lower levels of pay, there is both a lower level of average education attainment among 
workers and substantial employee turnover within companies in the sector as compared to 
Pharmaceuticals as above.   
In contrast to the Pharmaceutical sector discussed above, there has also been 
significant industrial action and conflictual relations between unions and employers in 
Grocery Retail over recent years. In particular, there have been significant episodes of high-
profile strike action at both Dunnes Stores and Tesco Ireland with consequences for union-
employer relations subsequently as Dunnes have consistently resisted attempts at union 
engagement and Tesco have moved away from effective engagement over time. This has 
resulted in very substantial challenges in developing meaningful dialogue between the key 
actors. Coupled with the fragmented firm-level structure of collective bargaining in the 
sector and limited union capacity, this has restricted severely the scope for either formal or 
informal coordination within the sector. 
 
4.2.2. Collective Bargaining in the Large Grocery Retail Sector in Ireland 
 
The Irish Grocery Retail sector has similarly been characterised by localised firm-level 
bargaining since the collapse of the National Wage Agreements framework. However, in 
sharp contrast to the Pharmaceuticals sector, the capacity to develop and implement a pay 
strategy by the trade unions in the Grocery Retail sector has been very limited due to an 
absence of sufficient power resources. The largest representative union in the sector, 
MANDATE, has lacked the resources to implement a coordinated strategy either 
independently or alongside the other unions operating in the sector. As evidenced in 
interview materials, the collapse of Social Partnership severely undermined the unions with 
significant growth in anti-union sentiment on the employers’ side and conflictual relations 
between Mandate and other unions and the major employers. The limited resources 
available to unions are compounded by the non-recognition of union representation in pay 
negotiations by a number of the large firms in the sector. 
The structural weakness of Mandate has resulted into the union operating largely 
as a campaigning force wherein strategy tends towards a reliance on publicity campaigns 
rather than an ability to design and implement targets as in the Pharmaceutical case. The 
union also has poor relationships with employers resulting in the need to rely on these 
publicity drives and a significant series of industrial disputes. The network in the Grocery 





particularly within Mandate and to a limited extent ICTU Private Sector Committee meetings 
functioning as key events. The weakness of the unions and the fragmented nature of the 
sector has clear implications for survey responses. The lack of the effective capacity to 
coordinate among unions, the lack of Mandate resources, and the conflictual relations with 
individual firms has resulted in very low survey uptake on the union side. This empirically 
observed pattern of low response is again theoretically relevant as it reflects the broader 
weakness and lack of organisation of weak unions within the sector in Ireland. 
On the employers’ side in Grocery Retail, there is a similar absence of organisation. 
As evidenced in interview materials, there is little or no coordination among employers with 
many of these being UK-based firms that conduct negotiations entirely independently with 
the unions in certain cases or without substantive union input at all in other firms. There is 
a similar absence of a role for IBEC in the sector as in Pharmaceuticals but in the case of 
Grocery Retail, this gap is not filled by the unions. As the sector is characterised by entirely 
firm-specific agreements, highly conflictual relations, the irrelevance of the employers’ 
association and the absence of traditional coordination, the challenges in achieving access 
and response to the survey reflect the absence of a clear network of coordination. The firm-
level structure again sharply limits the incentive and willingness of individuals within firms 
to participate.  
The limited coordination that occurs in the Grocery Retail sector in Ireland largely 
corresponds with the ‘information as coordination’ theorisation in which information 
dissemination regarding the outcomes of pay negotiation rounds and indeed industrial 
relations disputes takes place through Industrial Relations News. However, the signals and 
information generated through IRN publications have a more limited impact and uptake in 
the Grocery Retail sector. The sectoral pattern does though further underline the importance 
of the ‘information as coordination’ mechanism. The media signalling mechanism is the 
major, albeit narrow, means by which the limited coordination that does exist takes place 
and this is captured in a range of qualitative interview evidence. The broader absence of 
effective coordination on both the unions’ and employers’ side is itself demonstrated in the 
very low levels of cooperation and participation by both sets of actors in the survey study 
due to the fragmented, conflictual and atomised nature of the network in this sector. 
 
4.2.3. Network Analysis of CB in Large Grocery Retail: Survey Results 
 
Survey responses were, for the reasons outlined previously, very limited in the Retail sector. 
This is indicative of the fragmentation of employers, the limited capacity of unions, and the 
conflictual relations that characterise the sector. Table 11 illustrates that of the thirteen 
potential respondents identified from exploratory interviews and initial research, only one 
individual responded to the survey. This illustrates the underlying structural issues that 
characterise the sector which has a similar fragmented structure among employers to the 
Pharmaceutical sector but does not have a union with the strength and organising capacity 
of SIPTU to offset this. 
 
Table 11: Retail Sector Respondents Identified and Survey Response Rate in Ireland 
Sector Exploratory Network Size 
(actors in survey 
questions based on 
exploratory interviews) 
Survey Respondents Survey Response Rate 






While this low level of engagement inhibits substantive network analysis, the 
individual respondent identifies as a leading national negotiator in the Retail sector with 
extensive experience and provides certain useful overview of the sector in the associated 
responses. Table 12 illustrates the variety of significant challenges to coordination in Retail 
indicating that the economic and/or sectoral context presents the most significant 
challenge corresponding with the conflictual nature of industrial relations observed in the 
sector, the lack of engagement with unions by employers and the absence of effective 
organising. Further to this, the respondent identifies major challenges represented by 
fragmentation in representation that distinguishes the sector very clearly from 
Pharmaceuticals as the unions do not have the capacity to provide effective coordination 
through their internal cohesion and resources. There are also similarly challenges identified 
due to asymmetric power and a lack of trust between actors. This clearly matches the 
qualitative interview evidence collected and the pattern of relations observed. 
 
Table 12: Main Challenges to Coordination (1-5 scale, higher values indicate greater 
challenges) 











Retail 4 4 4 5 
 
 
The respondent also identifies key pattern setting firms in Retail and these 
correspond, for the most part, with major Retail companies identified above. It is important 
to note here that the respondent identifies Tesco and Dunnes Stores specifically, and these 
are firms that have been engaged in major disputes with workers and unions in recent 
times. The identification of these firms as pattern-setters illustrates the importance of these 
disputes and ultimately any potential deals that follow with these market-leading firms in 
establishing the dynamics across the sector. This tends to explain the substantially more 
conflictual relations of wage bargaining that have characterised the Retail sector and the 
difficulty in establishing coordination given union fragmentation and the resistance of major 
leading firms to engage. 
 
Table 13: Top Pattern-Setting Firms in Retail 


















Having examined the structure and extent of the networks underlying collective bargaining 
in Ireland across the Pharmaceutical and Large Grocery Retail Sectors through the analysis 
of survey data and extensive interview materials, a clear picture emerges. The primary 
takeaway is that it is where unions have significant power resources and the capacity to 
coordinate and implement wage bargaining strategy that coordination emerges in the Irish 
localised firm-level bargaining context. Table 14 illustrates the pattern of relations and 
coordination across unions and employers in the two sectors. Coordination comes from the 
union-side in the Irish context and this is conditioned by union strength and the capacity to 
provide coordination. Therefore, union-led coordination exists in the Pharmaceuticals sector 
where there is a strong primary union, but does not follow in Grocery Retail where the key 
unions are weak and there is fragmentation. Employers operate independently and do not 
demonstrate intra-employer coordination in either sector. Successful wage bargaining 
negotiations and stable union-employer relations are observed in the Pharmaceuticals 
sector and not in Retail despite the similar individualised firm-level bargaining framework. 
The key explanatory factor here is the differential capacity of unions to coordinate between 
the two sectors. 
 
 
Table 14: Coordination Capacity in the Irish Pharmaceutical and Grocery Retail Sectors for 
Unions and Employers  
 Pharmaceuticals Grocery Retail 
Unions strong power resources; 
substantial union density; 
single leading union; 
centralization of control within 
SIPTU; 
organizing potential; strong 
coordination within small group of 
actors; effective capacity to 
implement strategy 
very limited power resources; 
limited union density; 
fragmentation of union 
representation; 
campaigning union rather than 
effective negotiating force; 
reliance on public campaigns; 
non-recognition of unions in 
some firms; lack of capacity to 
lead coordination; lack of 
capacity to implement strategy 
 
Employers Large highly profitable US 
multinationals; firm-level 
negotiations; strong 
independence; lack of role for 
employers’ association; little 
informal collaboration; significant 
use of Industrial Relations news for 
‘information as coordination’; 
individual firms have largely 
cooperative relations with unions 
Large Irish and UK-based firms; 
firm-level negotiations; strong 
competition between firms; lack 
of role for employer’s 
association; little to no 
collaboration; some limited use 
of Industrial Relations News for 
‘information as coordination’; 
conflictual relations with unions; 








The success of the SIPTU strategy of targeting the large, highly-profitable 
pharmaceutical sector multinationals to establish an early pay norm target and pattern of 
longer, sustained agreements was built on its internal cohesion and capacity. Within-union 
coordination and centralisation among a small network of actors to devise and implement 
this strategy helped overcome the lack of coordination at sectoral level and in particular the 
otherwise strong impediments to coordination presented by the lack of collaboration 
among employers, their strong sense of  independence, and the limited industrial relations 
role for the overarching employers’ organisation. The union was also through its informal 
links with individual HR managers and latterly Industrial Relations News to establish and 
publicise this newly developed pay bargaining pattern.  In comparison, the limited power 
resources of Mandate, lower density, and absence of centralisation on the union side in 
Grocery Retail significantly impeded the development and realisation of such a strategy 
which, when combined with similarly individualised employers that tend not to 
communicate with each other or through the employers’ association vis-à-vis collective 
bargaining, has led to an absence of any network underpinning coordination in the sector. 
The limited power resources of the unions similarly undercut the establishment of stable 
informal relations with HR managers within the major employers which has likely been both 
a cause and consequence of the quite significant conflict in the sector in recent years. 
Our interviews also clearly establish the significant and distinctive role of Industrial 
Relations News in providing ‘information as coordination’ in the Irish context. In the 
Pharmaceuticals sector and likely exemplifying broader patterns, IRN was key in the 
dissemination of  information regarding the pattern of pay increases SIPTU had established 
through engagement with the highly profitable multinational firms and interview evidence 
with HR management in key firms and consultants familiar with the sector illustrate how 
this information was factored in before upcoming negotiations as regards expectations by 
employers. IRN’s publications and collated data on recent pay agreements was also a key 
avenue for SIPTU to establish the growing coalescence around the two per cent norm across 
other sectors over time with individual employers again clearly engaging with this material 
as it was circulated. Absent institutional structures, strong umbrella representative 
organisations as regards industrial relations and in a context of fragmentation, information 
of this sort is a key means of establishing coordination.  
From a methodological perspective, we identify both advantages and pitfalls as 
regards the application of social network analysis to industrial relations and collective 
bargaining based on an in-depth examination of the Irish context. There are clear theoretical 
and indeed empirical contributions to be made by considering coordination through a 
network perspective stressing the role of informal relations between actors. We see clearly 
from our interviews in the Irish context how relationships between key officials in SIPTU 
provided for the development of an alternative union-led coordination strategy in the 
context of a move to firm-level bargaining  while relations between union officials and both 
Pharmaceutical firm HR managers and IRN journalists was important in establishing and 
conveying the expectations and norms for forthcoming negotiations. This focus on 
informality provides a clear analytic advantage over traditional structural indicators and 
better accounts for the reality of interactions especially in Ireland where informal 
relationships are a core element of many forms of negotiation. 
There are however particular challenges to implementing a social network approach 
across divergent institutional contexts. In contrast to certain European cases where sectoral 
agreements are more common, the individual firm-level bargaining structure in Ireland 





that may be perceived to  impinge upon commercial sensitivities and perhaps more 
importantly, coordination and inter-firm engagement is severely limited. This coupled with 
the limited role for the employers’ association presented major access and participation 
challenges. Qualitative interview evidence has therefore been particularly important in 
tapping these dynamics and in a manner that the survey approach could only partially 
achieve.  
In turn, the absence of a network beyond that operating within the unions in the 
Pharmaceuticals sector severely affects the ability to capture relations through a network 
analysis. The fragmented employer structures in each sector and especially the low union 
capacity and conflictual relations between weaker unions and fragmented employers in 
Grocery Retail are readily apparent in interview evidence but are challenging to establish 
using this methodology given the absence of a meaningful network and the associated lack 
of participation in the survey. Finally, the critical role of Industrial Relations News that has 
emerged through our qualitative analysis is very challenging to incorporate as  it does not 
form a clear part of a ‘network’ as conceived but clearly provides a distinctive form of 
coordination through information in the Irish context. As a central media actor, it provides 
an important signalling device. 
While we therefore identify the scope for substantive contributions to the literature 
on industrial relations and wage coordination through the use of network analysis, 
consideration must be given to the applicability to more atomised firm-level bargaining 
structures in liberal market economies such as Ireland where more qualitative methods 
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